Efficient allocation of resources requires well functioning markets for exchanging financial claims.
Many financial securities, including municipal bonds, are traded through decentralized and opaque networks of financial intermediaries. In a decentralized dealership market, financial intermediaries form a network characterized by repeat interactions and long-term relations to facilitate the provision of liquidity to investors, the sharing of inventory risk, and the flow of information. But concentration of order flow reduces resilience to shocks and allows central dealers to exploit their advantage when interacting with investors. As a result, order execution quality and liquidity provision not only vary across trading venues and time but also depend systematically on dealers' centrality within the market. The following market commentary from New York Fed officials, who regularly talk to bond dealers, supports this notion: "...Lastly, we have spoken about illiquidity in the market. It can be difficult to quantify liquidity in the market, and the color we hear from people in the market can really depend on the shop they are trading at. We've gotten the sense that trading may have been normal at larger dealers, but significantly light at smaller dealers." (Corporate Credit Biweekly Call, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, October 12, 2011) In this paper, we use the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's (MSRB) proprietary Transaction Reporting System audit trail to study how market quality varies across the dealerships in municipal bonds and, in particular, how dealer centrality affects trading costs, liquidity provision, and price discovery. How well dealership markets perform in terms of market quality is largely an open question. Existing literature compares market quality across market structures or marketwide measures over time. 1 The impact on market quality of networked trading within a market is an important and understudied area.
The structure of the financial markets is pivotal for execution quality. When financial markets are underdeveloped, search and contractual frictions impose punitive transaction costs and hinder efficient price formation. By reducing transaction costs, financial intermediaries and trading facilities enable better allocation of securities among investors and improve risk sharing. The trading 1 Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) analyze cross-market trading by informed investors. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) provide evidence for liquidity commonality across stocks. Hatch and Johnson (2002) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) study time variation in liquidity. Coughenour and Saad (2004) study liquidity spillovers across NYSE market-makers. Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2005) and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) study liquidity externalities and trading costs in corporate bonds. In recent work, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) study the liquidity impact of financial intermediaries' entry. Cespa and Foucault (2011) analyze liquidity spillovers across securities. mechanism also enhances price discovery, or how efficiently new information is incorporated into prices. Efficient price discovery contributes to better real resource allocation, benefiting issuers and society at large by improving real investment decisions and increasing welfare.
The municipal bond market is the largest and most important capital market for state and municipal issuers. Its effective functioning is crucial for the provision of public services and the welfare of society. Trading of the bonds is organized like a typical decentralized broker-dealer market with limited pre-and post-trade transparency. More than 700 broker-dealer firms (all of which are obliged to register with the regulatory body MSRB) are actively trading in municipals in an average month.
We start by characterizing the bond market's structure in terms of the network of inter-dealer trading relations and its evolution and stability over time. We measure dealer centrality by their direct and indirected connections with other dealers through inter-dealer trading relations. The centrality measures that we use are borrowed from the literature on network analysis. We then document how the terms of trade for investors, the provision of liquidity by dealers, and the efficiency of prices depend on the financial intermediaries' position within the topology of the market. This provides insights into the incentives and market forces faced by broker-dealers in financial markets, the determinants of market quality, and the efficiency of price formation.
Our main empirical findings on the relation between trading costs, inventories, price efficiency, and dealer centrality are as follows:
1. The dealership network in municipal bonds exhibits a hierarchical core-periphery structure with around 30 highly connected dealers at its core and several hundred peripheral dealer firms. There is strong persistence in trading relations between dealers and in dealer ranks.
5. Dealers' bargaining position in trading with customers is stronger for central dealers than for peripheral dealers.
These findings suggest that competition is fierce at the periphery but not at the core of the decentralized market because of opacity and search frictions, giving rise to network effects. In networked dealership markets, investors face a trade-off between transactions cost and intermediation service quality (liquidity provision, price efficiency). Concentration of order flow with few central dealers leads to more efficient aggregation of new information about asset values and yields economies of scale in transaction processing and risk management-lowering transactions cost. On the other hand, concentration may reduce financial market stability and resilience to shocks, increasing risk and costs. In addition, dealers will be in a superior position to observe aggregate order flow and learn about the motives for trade. This will allow them to exploit their informational advantage when interacting with market participants, yielding them market power and raising trading costs. As a result, highly connected dealers at the center of the market offer accurate and efficient prices at a cost. By contrast, dealers on the periphery offer more competitive bid-ask spreads at the expense of lower liquidity and less informationally efficient prices. We provide support for these predictions in a proprietary sample of trades in municipal bonds. The results, more generally, shed light on the trade-offs investors face when trading in over-the-counter markets, which may guide financial market design.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data sources.
Section 2 documents the microstructure of the municipal bond market in terms of the trading relations between dealer firms. Section 3 documents how execution quality varies across dealers.
Section 4 explores the relation between order flow, dealer inventory behavior, and dealer centrality.
In Section 5, we provide evidence that networked trading allows dealers to charge discretionary markups. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background and Data
The municipal bond market is the largest and most important capital market for state and municipal issuers. It is a typical decentralized broker-dealer market with limited pre-and post-trade transparency. All trades are intermediated by broker-dealers who are registered with the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). The MSRB is the self-regulatory body for the municipal bond market. Trade execution mostly occurs manually through sequential bilateral negotiations, by phone or electronic communication (see Biais (1993) and Yin (2005) for theoretical analysis). More than 700 broker-dealer firms are actively trading in municipal bonds in an average month. The trades are intermediated by a total of 2,078 dealer firms. 2 They provide liquidity by prearranging trades between customers or taking bonds into inventory.
Data sources: Our main data source is the proprietary MSRB Transaction Reporting System audit trail recorded by the MSRB. In an effort to improve market transparency, the MSRB requires all dealers in municipal debt to register with the MSRB and report all trades conducted in any municipal security. The data is thus comprehensive. Unlike the publicly available version of historical municipal bond transactions, our data provides identification of the dealer firms intermediating customer trades; for inter-dealer trades the data identify the dealers on each side of the trade. 3
The transactions data cover the 13 year period between February 1998 and July 2011. In addition to the complete transactions data, we obtain reference information on all outstanding bonds, including issuance date, maturity, coupon, taxable status, ratings, call features, issue size, and issuer characteristics from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Global Public Finance database.
We filter the transactions data to eliminate data errors and ensure data completeness. For a bond to be in our sample, we require availability of reference data in SDC and require the bond to have a fixed coupon. Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff (2007) and Schultz (2012) document that trading and liquidity in newly issued bonds are markedly different from seasoned issues. For our transaction level analysis, we therefore remove all trades during the first 90 days after issuance.
2 Many of the registered dealerships are not very active. On average, about 735 broker-dealer firms are trading in any given month. In addition, several broker-dealer firms experienced an M&A or bankruptcy during the sample period. As a result, there are about 1,770 firms still registered at the end of the sample period.
3 The data do not provide identifiers for the dealers' customers. See Hendershott and Madhavan (2011) for a recent study employing customer identifiers.
Our final sample consists of approximately 60 million transactions in 1.4 million different bond issues. The trades are intermediated by a total of 2,078 dealer firms. Out of all transactions, 16 million are trades between dealers and the remainder are trades between investors and dealers.
Network measures for dealer centrality: The bond dealers' trading relations and relative positions in the trading network can be described by various network characteristics. There are six measures of centrality that are widely used in network analysis: degree centrality, k-core, eigenvector centrality, betweenness, closeness, and cliquishness.
• Degree centrality measures connectivity of a dealer in the network (a local property) by computing the fraction of dealers in the network to which the dealer firm is directly connected through bilateral trades (direct neighbors). Derived from degree is the k-core, which measures centrality as the maximal sub-network in which each dealer has at least degree k.
• Eigenvector centrality measures importance of a dealer in the network (a global property) by assigning relative scores to all dealers in the network based on the principle that connections to high-scoring dealers contribute more to the score of the dealer than equal connections to low-scoring dealers.
• Betweenness measures absolute position by taking into account the connections beyond the first neighbors (indirect neighbors). Betweenness is computed by counting the number of shortest paths linking any two dealers in the network that pass through the dealer firm. Like eigenvector centrality, betweenness captures a dealer's overall importance.
• Closeness measures influence with respect to centrality by computing the inverse of the average number of steps that a dealer needs to take within the network to reach or be reached by any other dealer firm.
• Cliquishness measures local connectivity by computing the likelihood that two associates of a dealer are associates themselves. The correlation between degree and cliquishness determines the hierarchical structure of the network. Table 1 provides a more detailed description of the centrality measures. We aggregate all network variables to a single index, denoted N et, by taking the first principle component across the measures as described in Table 1 . For robustness, we construct both equal-weighted and value-weighted centrality measures, where we weight each connection by the order flow between the dealers. Our results are robust to taking the individual statistics or the aggregate statistic N et.
[ Table 1 about here]
The network properties for each dealer are calculated using all inter-dealer transactions between February 1998 and July 2011. For every day during our sample period, we compute a directed network based on transactions during the past 30 calendar days. The number of trades between each pair of dealers and the total par amount of trade between them are recorded for the different weighting schemes. Following Milbourn (2003) and others, we apply an empirical cumulative distribution function (ecdf) transformation for each network variable to reduce skewness in the variable and diminish the impact of outliers. The ecdf transformation also facilitates interpretation of the economic magnitude of the results. As distribution functions take values between 0 and 1, a change from 0 to 1 in the network variables corresponds to moving from the least central position to the most central position across dealers. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables describing the dealers' network characteristics. We track all 2,078 dealer firms over 3,400 trading days with a rolling window of 30 calendar days, yielding 2,498,266 dealer-day observations. On average, 700 to 800 dealers are actively trading on a given month. Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the dealers' network-related characteristics and N et. Panel A reports correlation coefficients for the equal-weighted centrality measures, and Panel B for the value-weighted variants. Across columns, we vary between the raw and standardized network measures. While the various network characteristics measure different aspects of network relations, there is a sizeable common component. The correlations between the variables and N et are significantly positive but typically less than unity. Cliquishness cc is the exception, in that it correlates negatively with most other measures.
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here] 2 OTC market structure
In the following, we describe the microstructure of the municipal bond market in terms of the trading relations between dealer firms. We also provide descriptive statistics on connectedness, hierarchical structure, and shock resilience in the municipal bond market.
Network of inter-dealer trading relations
We first describe the structure of the dealership market by measuring the order flow between dealers.
Some dealers interact frequently, others rarely or never. The strength of a relation between a pair of dealers can be measured by the number of times or, alternatively, by the number of bonds they trade with each other. One can also assign a direction to a relation depending on who buys and who sells. In the following, a dealer firm is identified by its MRSB registration. We pool all transactions over the sample period. We later study the time-series dynamics of trading relations. Figure 1 illustrates the network structure of dealers in the municipal bond market in terms of order flow between dealers. Each node represents a dealer. Each arrow represents directed order flow between two dealers (we only consider order flows that exceed a minimum of $5,000 in par value). In Panel A, we impose the restriction that order flow between two dealers exceeds 10,000 transactions over the sample period. This allows us to focus on the most connected dealers, forming the core of the municipal bond market. In Panel B, we plot the dealer network using all transactions. The plots in Panel A and B are generated using multidimensional scaling. The figure suggests that the municipal bond market has a hierarchical core-periphery structure. Around 30 dealers are highly connected and trade heavily with other dealers. In contrast, the remaining several hundred dealer firms are peripheral in that they trade less frequently and with a more limited number of trading partners.
[ Figure 1 about here]
OTC market connectedness, hierarchy, and resilience
We can use the dealers' network characteristics introduced in Section 1 to determine systematic patterns in inter-dealer relations and overall market structure. In a centralized market, each investor can trade with everybody else, so the market is perfectly connected. In decentralized markets, investors have preferred dealers and, in turn, dealers trade preferably with their associates. The question arises whether all dealers trade with each other in the municipal bond market or whether they form long-term relations, and how do these patterns vary across dealers? Figure 2 documents the connectedness of the market. We plot the degree distribution across dealers in the network. The black dots correspond to the out-degrees, the red dots represent in-degrees. The dots trace out the inverse distribution function of degrees across dealers. For comparison, we add the degree distribution of a random trading network (blue dashed line) and a scale-free trading network (black and red dashed lines). The plot reveals that municipal bond dealers are much more connected with each other than suggested by random trading (a random trading network yields a Poisson distribution of degrees). There is a large number of weakly connected dealers but also a significant number of highly connected dealers-forming the core of the dealer network. The municipal bond market thus exhibits features of a scale-free network. 4 Figure 3 explores a different aspect of the dealer network by documenting the hierarchical structure of the market. A natural question is whether the municipal bond market has a single market center (and a periphery of loosely connected dealers) or several local market centers? To answer this question, we plot the degree distribution across dealers in the network (horizontal axis) against the clustering coefficient, or cliquishness, of each dealer (vertical axis). The plot reveals that sparsely connected dealers are part of local markets (highly clustered sub-markets), with order flow between the different local markets being maintained by a few dealer hubs. 5 Figures 2 and 3 combined reveal that the municipal bond market has a hierarchical core-periphery structure.
4 Scale-free networks are characterized by a power-law degree distribution. The probability that a node has k links follows P r(k) ∼ k −γ , where γ is the degree exponent. The probability that a node is highly connected is statistically more significant than in a random graph. As a result, the network's properties are often determined by a relatively small number of highly connected nodes, which are known as hubs. See Erdös and Rényi (1960) and Albert, Réka, and Barabási (1999) .
5 Hierarchical modularity yields scaling of the clustering coefficient, which follows cc(k) ∼ 1/k and, hence, traces out a straight line of slope 1 on a log-log plot. See Ravasz et al. (2002) .
Concentration of order flow with few dealers leads to more efficient aggregation of new information about asset values and yields economies of scale in transaction processing and risk management-lowering transactions cost. On the other hand, concentration may reduce financial market stability and resilience to shocks, increasing risk and costs. We next explore the market's resilience to shocks to the network structure by means of network comparative statics. The type of shocks we are interested in are defaults by dealers, or market exit. Figure 4 documents the effect on the network structure of default by individual dealers. Default is defined here as a situation in which all order flow to and from the dealer disappears, and the network is otherwise held fixed. 6 We borrow this type of comparative statics analysis from the networks literature (Albert, Jeong, and Barabási (2000)). We plot the relative size of the largest connected subgraph (the so-called giant component) as a function of the number of dealers that default. We consider two scenarios. The blue line corresponds to the network connectedness when dealers default at random. The red line corresponds to the network connectedness when the most connected dealers default first. In Panel A, the horizontal axis measures the number of defaulted dealers as a fraction of all dealers. In Panel B, the defaulted dealers are sorted on the horizontal axis according to their degree. The figure suggests that the municipal bond market is remarkably robust to random and targeted defaults of dealer firms. The reason is that the market has at its center several highly connected dealer hubs that can act as substitutes for each other, diversifying the risk of instability. The nature of financial intermediation-standing ready to provide liquidity-leads dealers to interact repeatedly with other dealers. Do such repeat interactions lead to long-term relations between dealers that benefit themselves and other market participants? Are relations formed and broken opportunistically when one dealer's inventory matches the needs of another dealer and gains from 6 That is, we take the network structure as given and abstract from the market's endogenous response to dealer defaults. The descriptive statistics should therefore be interpreted as features of the network rather than economic responses of the dealers or the market as a whole. By contrast, we would need an exogenous source of variation in the network structure to measure the economic impact of dealer defaults.
trade exist, or are dealer relations formed strategically? To address these questions, we explore how stable are relations between dealers over time and what impact this has on the persistence in dealer ranks. Table 4 shows the transition probabilities of the individual inter-dealer relationships. Conditional on a directional (that is, buy vs. sell) inter-dealer relation that existed in one month, the same directional relation exists with 62% probability in the next month. Ignoring trade directions, the probability that two dealers who traded in one month also trade in the next month is 65%.
To put these numbers in perspective, both probabilities are 1.4% in an idealized random network. 7
This suggests a high level of persistence in the trading relations between dealers and in the direction of the order flow. Table 5 focuses on the persistence in dealer ranks, as measured by the ordering of the dealers' centrality N et. Dealer ranks are highly persistent from one month to the next. The top 10 dealers remain at the top of their league with 93% chance. Yet, there is sizeable downside potential. The chance of losing ranks is on average twice as high as the chance of winning ranks, as captured in the columns Pr(Up) and Pr(Down). This is consistent with the notion that peripheral, lower ranked dealers compete aggressively to gain ranks, that is, to become more central.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here]
Having shown that dealers vary substantially in the amount of trading they do with each other, we now study the link between dealers' trading relations and (local) market quality.
3 Order execution quality and dealer centrality bond went from C ustomer to Dealer and then to another C ustomer. There are a total of 3,332,104 CDC-Nonsplit round-trips in our sample.
Alternatively, the dealer purchasing the bond can split the bond lot into smaller sizes and sell each piece to a different customer. We call such transactions CDC-Splits, as there is still only one dealer involved. There are a total of 1,236,766 CDC-Split round-trips in our sample, for a total number of 4,568,870 CDC round-trips.
Dealers can, alternatively, involve other dealers in the intermediation by using the inter-dealer market. Such round-trips start with a dealer purchasing a bond from a customer, followed by one or several inter-dealer trades that move the bond from the head dealer to the tail dealer, and end with sale from the tail dealer to a customer. In order to be able to trace the flow of a bond across the dealers with reasonable certainty, we consider only unsplit round-trips. We allow for a maximum of 6 dealers in the sequence of trades (there are very few cases involving 7 or more dealers). We call this type of round-trip C(N)DC-Nonsplit, where (N) indicates that multiple dealers may be involved. The C(N)DC-Nonsplit sample comprises 3,635,309 round-trips. Among these, 8.3% (or, a total of 303,205) involve more than one dealer.
Throughout our analysis, we eliminate trades between customers and dealers in which a dealer acts in the capacity of agent (as opposed to principle). The reason is that dealers acting as agent are compensated through commission, not markup. Agency trades account for 6% of the sample.
According to this classification, we consider three samples for our empirical analysis. The baseline sample consists of all CDC-Nonsplit round-trips. For this sample, we are the most certain that the same dealer handles both the bid-and ask-side trades. The second sample includes all split orders, comprising all CDC round-trips. This sample is more representative of a typical trade but may add some noise when split orders are wrongly assigned to be part of the same round-trip.
The last sample are the C(N)DC-Nonsplit trades which include all round-lot transactions flowing through the dealership network.
Trading costs and dealer centrality
We can now relate order execution costs to trade types and dealer centrality. We measure trading costs by the markup on round-trip transactions charged by dealers. The dealers' markups are computed as the difference between the par-weighted average price at which they sold the bonds to customers and the price at which they purchased the bonds, scaled by the purchase price. Table 6 and Figure 5 report descriptive statistics for dealer markups on round-trip transactions across trade categories. Markups are measured in percent of the dealer's original purchase price from customer. In reporting these numbers, we apply no data filters. For the regression analysis performed later, we winsorize the round-trip costs at 0.5% and 99.5%. Average round-trip trading costs on non-splits are 1.77% (1.66% at median), while dealers earn an average of 2.00% (2.01% at median) on split round-trips. Round-trip costs vary widely across transactions within category, from about 0.73% at the lower quartile to 2.75% at the upper quartile of the distribution for CDC round-trips. Average markups decline monotonically with transaction size, as illustrated by Panel A of Figure 5 (see Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff (2007) and Harris and Piwowar (2006) ).
Panel B of Table 6 shows that average markups increase monotonically with the number of dealers intermediating the trade. The total markup for round-trips involving six dealers peaks at 4.19%.
This trading cost is roughly equal to the annual coupon payment on an average bond.
[ Table 6 and Figure 5 about here] Total round-trip costs when more than one dealer is involved reveal another feature. Panel B of Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for dealer markups on round-trip transactions with varying number of dealers involved. CDC are customer-dealer-customer transactions without interdealer trading. CDDC, CDDDC, CDDDDC, CDDDDDC and CDDDDDDC are round-trip pairs intermediated by two, three, four, five and, respectively, six dealers. We restrict the sample to nonsplits, yielding 3,635,309 observations. Markups are again measured in percentage of the dealer's purchase price from customer. Trading costs rise with the degree of dealer involvement. Average round-trip costs are 1.77% when one dealer handles the bond lot. This number rises to 4.19% when six dealers intermediate before the bond reaches a customer. In the extreme, transactions involving more than four dealers exceed 7% costs in more than 5% of cases.
Having documented that total trading costs rise with the number of dealers involved, the natural question is how much does each dealer in the chain of intermediaries earn? This allows examining how the total surplus from financial intermediation is split among dealers. In particular, does the first, middle, or last dealer earn more than the remaining dealers? Table 7 reports average markups per dealer on round-trip transactions with varying degree of dealer involvement. Total dealer markups are broken down by the number of dealers (across rows) and by each dealer (across columns) in the sequence of dealers intermediating the round-trip transaction. We restrict the sample to non-splits. We find that the dealer closest to the ultimate buyer earns the largest share of the overall profits, irrespective of how many dealers are involved.
[ Table 7 about here]
Dealer markups on round-trip transactions vary substantially across trades, as documented in Table 6 . Are they systematically related to the centrality of the dealer intermediating the trade? sizes. Average bid-ask spreads differ by up to 80%. For medium-sized trades, bid-ask spreads at central dealers are 40% higher than the average, while they are 40% lower than the average at peripheral dealers. For small and large trades, the difference is smaller but still positive. Table 8 documents using multivariate regressions how total round-trip trading costs depend on the network position of the intermediating dealer. Across columns, we vary the centrality measure and, respectively, the trade categories. In columns (1)-(4), the dealer centrality measure Net is defined as the first principle component of the equal-weighted centrality proxies. In columns (5)-(8), the dealer centrality measure Net is defined as the first principle component of the value-weighted centrality proxies. The regression samples are CDC-Nonsplit, All CDC, and C(N)DC-Nonsplit, respectively. The estimates are obtained from panel regressions with issuer fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
The estimates reveal that trading costs are positively related to dealer centrality and other measures of connectedness of dealers. Highly connected dealers, due to their central network position, are able to charge larger markups to investors than peripheral dealers. Being connected to a central dealer may offer advantages to investors in need of selling a bond. Yet, central dealers are in a better position to charge large spreads than peripheral dealers. Last, the C(N)DC-Nonsplit sample reveals that dealers' total profits are more sensitive to the network centrality of the tail dealer than to the head dealer.
[ Table 8 about here]
Intermediation risk and dealer centrality
Central dealers charge larger markups than peripheral dealers, as documented in Figure 5 and Table 8 . Are central dealers, in turn, taking on more risk? We next ask how variable are central dealers' profits relative to those of peripheral dealers? The natural way to examine this is by looking at the probability of taking a trading loss on a round-trip transaction. Table 9 documents the determinants of trading losses. In each of our three round-trip samples, dealers lose money in less than 2% of the round-trips. Still, the loss probability depends strongly on the dealers' relative position in the network, on bond characteristics, and other explanatory variables. We use a panel probit model with issuer fixed effects to estimate the determinants of dealers' losses. In each of the three samples, central dealers are less likely to lose on round-trips than peripheral dealers. Thus, the profits of connected dealers are larger on average and less risky.
[ Table 9 about here]
Price efficiency across the dealer network
While Table 9 reveals that central dealers incur smaller trading losses ex post, it could be that they widen spreads to mitigate adverse selection risk from investors with superior information or processing skill. On the other hand, highly connected dealers, due to their central network position, observe a larger fraction of a bond's aggregate order flow and order flow in more bonds than peripheral dealers. Central dealers can therefore better filter liquidity motives for trade and aggregate fundamental information than dealers with little exposure to aggregate order flow. As a result, one would expect that bond prices are more efficient at central dealers.
To determine informational price efficiency, we adopt the Hasbrouck (1993) and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) settings and adjust their market quality measures to our setting with decentralized, infrequent trading. Hasbrouck's local trend model in which price movements are decomposed into permanent and transitory components provides a parametric estimate for market quality, M Q.
Market quality is highest when prices are martingales so that price changes are uncorrelated. Autocorrelation in returns can therefore be viewed as a proxy for market quality. In Hasbrouck's parametric model, market quality is captured by the first-order lag in autocorrelation. In decentralized markets with infrequent trading, however, market imperfections can affect price dynamics beyond the first lag. We therefore construct a non-parametric market quality measure that is robust to return autocorrelation with an unspecified structure.
Time-series variation in returns can be decomposed into permanent and transitory components by quantifying predictable and, respectively, unpredictable variation. The standard estimator for return variance ignores autocorrelation in returns and measures total price variation:
where N is the number of trading days in a given bond. In contrast to the standard estimator, the Newey and West (1987) HAC estimator for variance is robust to autocorrelated disturbances with an unspecified structure. A robust estimator for return variance captures the predictable variation
where Newey and West (1987)) and the autocovariance of lag l is defined as
The difference between the standard and the robust estimator of return variance provides a non-parametric estimate of market quality by quantifying the autocorrelation in returns for any L ≥ 1. Information efficiency can therefore be measured by
M Q L = 1 corresponds to a situation in which all return movements are permanent, so that σ 2 L = σ 2 0 .
The market is then considered perfectly informationally efficient. M Q L = 0 corresponds to a situation in which all return movements are transitory and eventually reversed, so that σ 2 L = 0.
The market quality measure M Q 1 (that is, L = 1) corresponds to the model in Hasbrouck (1993) and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) , where autocorrelation in returns is measured up to the first lag.
In our empirical specification, we compute four alternative M Q L measures. We set L = 1 to be in line with the prior literature and use either transaction-by-transaction data or daily midpoint data. Alternatively, we set L = 10 (around T 1 4 as stipulated by Newey and West (1987) ). The specifications with L = 10 capture general return autocorrelation patterns. Table 10 for heteroskedasticity and clustering at dealer level. We find consistently across specifications that prices are more efficient at central dealers. Central dealers thus seem to be better informed than peripheral dealers.
[ Table 10 about here]
Liquidity provision across the dealer network
Bond dealers provide liquidity in two ways, by prearranging trades between customers (similar to a limit order) or taking bonds into inventory (similar to a market order). Highly connected dealers, due to their central network position, are better able to spread inventory risk across their neighbors than peripheral dealers. They can provide liquidity more efficiently to investors and afford greater inventory risk. We would therefore expect that central dealers hold larger and more volatile inventory, have longer inventory durations, and exhibit a lower propensity to prearrange trades than peripheral dealers. We now explore the relation between order flow volume, dealer inventory behavior, and dealer centrality. Central dealers trade more often and overall larger volume than peripheral dealers.
[ Table 11 about here]
Inventory risk taking
We now turn to dealers' inventory risk taking behavior. Dealers' inventories are computed separately for each bond using all trades in bonds that occurs at least 90 days after the original sale date from the underwriter. We use two measures for inventory changes, absolute daily inventory changes in $K and, alternatively, percentage absolute daily inventory changes in %. We define percentage absolute daily inventory changes as |∆inv t / 1 30 Central dealers can have longer inventory durations partly because they are less reluctant to take on inventory than peripheral dealers. To check whether this is the case we focus on prearranged trades, which are similar to limit orders in equity markets. In a prearranged trade, an investor indicates trading interest to the dealer. The dealer then searches for a counterparty. Only once two trading parties are found or likely to be found, the dealer takes the bond off the seller's hand.
In this case, the dealer provides intermediation services without committing capital.
Columns (3) through (6) in Table 13 [ Tables 12 and 13 about here] Table 14 reports the average network centrality of each dealer in the intermediation chain for C(N)DC-Nonsplit trades. We again measure dealer centrality by the first principle component of all equal-weighted network variables in Table 1 , normalized by the ecdf transformation. As one would expect, inter-dealer trading occurs systematically through the assistance of central dealers.
Order flow routing
Consistently across rows, the dealers in the middle have more central network positions than either the dealer purchasing the bond from a customer or the dealer ultimately selling the bond to a customer. Dealer centrality peaks with the second dealer for all types of C(N)DC-Nonsplit trades.
Dealers at the end of the chain, the "tail" dealers, have higher levels of centrality than dealers at the beginning of the chain, the "head" dealers.
[ Table 14 about here]
How does the complexity of dealer intermediation, as measured by the number of dealers in the sequence of trades, depend on the network centrality of the first dealer and last dealer ("head" and "tail") in the trade sequence?
We explore this question in two ways. First, if we fix the identity of the head and tail dealers, we can calculate the frequency with which one through five inter-dealer trades happen between these dealers. Table 15 , Panel A shows the summary statistics of the frequencies. In the overall sample, two dealers are connected through one inter-dealer trade with probability 44.8%, two inter-dealer trades with probability 45.4%, conditional on two dealers being connected in the sample. For dealer pairs that interact more often (at least 10 trades during the sample period), the probability that they are connected by only one inter-dealer trade is 52.6%.
Second, we can look at all sequences of dealer trades and regress the number of dealers in the round-trip on the centrality of the head and tail dealers. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 15 include sequences of trades that have at least one dealer, and columns (3) and (4) require the round-trip to have at least two dealers (i.e., head and tail). The complexity of intermediation is negatively related to the centrality of both the head dealer and the tail dealer.
[ Table 15 about here]
Liquidity spillover
The question remaining is why central dealers take on more inventory risk? One explanation is that inventory risk sharing with connected dealers reduces inventory costs. If this is the case, we would expect to observe positive inventory spillovers across dealers. Table 16 documents spillover effects in dealer inventories from connected dealers. The model we consider for the inventory decision y i of dealer i is:
where w ij equals the connection strength between dealers i and j, and X i is a set of explanatory variables. The coefficient λ measures inventory spillovers across dealers. The dependent variables are constructed as average values over the sample period. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood (estimates from GMM/IV are similar and omitted). The estimate for λ is significantly positive in all specifications, suggesting strong positive inventory spillover effects. Large dealer inventories (levels, changes, and volatilities) cause connected dealers to increase their own inventories.
[ Table 16 about here]
Strategic dealer pricing
The natural question deriving from the previous sections is why can central dealers charge larger and less variable spreads than peripheral dealers? One hypothesis is that the dealers' network position allows them to exploit centrality in bargaining with customers. To explore this hypothesis, we adapt the framework for intermediation in dealership markets developed in Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff (GHS, 2007) to our network setting. When customers and dealers negotiate over the surplus from trade, the equilibrium markup on transaction i is determined as follows:
where N et i denotes the network centrality of the dealer intermediating trade i, X i is a set of explanatory variables, i is a normally distributed variable, and u i ≥ 0 is a one-sided error drawn from an exponential distribution with parameter
, where the Z i denote a set of conditioning variables. We also allow the standard deviation of i to be log-linear in N et i and the conditioning variables Z i :
In this model, markups can rise with dealer centrality for two reasons. Physical intermediation costs affect markups deterministically by alternating the intercept term in a stochastic frontier regression (captured by β). A dealer's bargaining position, by contrast, has a stochastic effect on markups. Better bargaining raises the mean of the one-sided random component in markups (captured by β λ ). This stochastic frontier model for dealers' round-trip markups can be estimated using maximum likelihood. The estimated parameters for the one-sided component can be interpreted as a measure for dealers' bargaining power. [ Table 17 about here]
Conclusion
The structure of the financial markets is an important determinant of trading costs, liquidity, and price discovery. Many financial securities, including municipal bonds, are traded through decentralized and opaque networks of financial intermediaries. The dealership network facilitates the sharing of inventory risk and the flow of information, but the concentration of order flow reduces resilience to shocks and allows central dealers to exploit their advantage when interacting with investors. We provide evidence for these tradeoffs in a comprehensive sample of trades in municipal bonds. We find that the dealership network exhibits a hierarchical core-periphery structure with around 30 highly interconnected dealers at its core and several hundred peripheral dealer firms.
There is strong persistence in dealers' trading relations and in dealer ranks. Dealers' average markups increase with their network centrality. Central dealers charge up to 80% larger spreads than peripheral dealers, while facing a smaller probability of a trading loss. The informational efficiency of transaction prices rises with the centrality of the intermediating dealer. Dealers are exposed to significant liquidity spillovers from connected dealers. Central dealers provide more liquidity to customers than peripheral dealers; they trade more often and in larger aggregate volume.
Central dealers also take more inventory risk. Dealers' bargaining position in trading with customers is stronger for central dealers than for peripheral dealers. These findings suggest that competition is fierce at the periphery but not at the core of the decentralized market because of opacity, search frictions, and network effects. Our results, more generally, shed light on the trade-offs investors face when trading in over-the-counter markets, which may guide financial market design. Degree dg A measure of the local connectivity of a dealer. The degree of a dealer is computed as the sum of all direct relations that a dealer has with other dealers in the network, divided by the total number of dealers in the network. Degree captures the order flow and information to which a dealer is exposed, because it measures the fraction of dealers to which the dealer firm is connected. For directed graphs, one can calculate indegree dgin and, respectively, out-degree dgout. For weighted graphs, one can calculate weighted variants: dgoutwntrade = Out-degree, weighted by number of trades. dginwntrade = In-degree, weighted by number of trades. dgoutwpar = Out-degree, weighted by total par amount. dginwpar = In-degree, weighted by total par amount.
Eigenvector centrality ev A measure of the overall importance of a dealer firm in the network. It assigns relative scores to all dealers in the network based on the principle that connections to highscoring dealers contribute more to the score of the dealer firm than equal connections to low-scoring dealers. For weighted graphs, one can calculate weighted variants: evwntrade = Eigenvector centrality, weighted by number of trades. evwpar = Eigenvector centrality, weighted by total par amount.
Betweenness bt A measure of the absolute position of a dealer in the network. The betweenness of a dealer is computed as the number of shortest paths linking two dealers in the network that pass through the dealer firm. Betweenness measures the connections beyond the first neighbors, and it takes into account the connections of the neighbors and the neighbors' neighbors. A dealer with a high degree of betweenness is in a critical position where a large flux of order flow and information pass through; they are called "hubs." We use the directed graph version of betweenness.
Closeness cl A measure of influence with respect to centrality, rather than information or order flow. The closeness of a dealer is computed as the inverse of the average number of steps that a dealer needs to take within the network to reach or be reached by any other dealer firm. It captures the connection to highly influential dealers. For directed graphs, clout measures out-links only; clin measures in-links only.
K-core kcore
The maximal sub-network in which each dealer has at least degree k. For directed graphs, one differentiates between kcoreout and kcorein, the largest k-cores the dealer belongs to, counting only out-links or in-links.
Cliquishness cc A measure of the likelihood that two associates of a dealer are associates themselves. A higher value indicates a greater cliquishness. cc is also called clustering coefficient or transitivity. 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14** Table 9 : Loss probability and dealer centrality
N et
The table reports the determinants for the probability that dealers take a loss on a round-trip transaction. We vary the regression sample across columns, considering three types of trades with varying dealer involvement. CDCNonsplits are round-trips intermediated by a single dealer where the original bond lot is not split. The All CDC sample includes all round-trips intermediated by a single dealer. C(N)DC-Nonsplit are round-trips intermediated by one or several dealers where the original bond lot is not split. The dealer centrality measure N et is the first principal component of the network variables in Table 1 . The EW (VW) columns employ the equal-weighted (value-weighted) dealer centrality measures. For the C(N)DC-Nonsplit sample, N et is defined as the head or, alternatively, the tail dealer's centrality (indicated in the column header). The estimates are obtained from panel probit regressions with issuer fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The table documents the determinants of price efficiency. Information efficiency is measured by the M QL measure described in Section 3. M QL is calculated separately for each bond using daily mid-price data; M QL is then collapsed at the dealer level. Across columns, we vary the construction of the market quality measure M QL and the network centrality measure Net. M QL is computed either based on daily midpoint or trade-by-trade price changes. In the EW columns, the dealer centrality measure Net is defined as the first principle component of the equal-weighted centrality proxies. In the VW columns, the dealer centrality measure Net is defined as the first principle component of the value-weighted centrality proxies. The estimates are obtained from OLS regression with year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at dealer level. (6) document the determinants of the propensity of prearranged trades. We consider two types of prearranged trades, immediate and same day matches. Immediate matches have the same time stamp for dealer purchase and sale (columns (3) and (4)). Same day matches are round-trip transactions where the dealer purchase and sale occur on the same calendar day (columns (5) and (6)). The estimates account for year fixed effect. The dealer centrality measure N et is the first principal component of the network variables in Table 1 . The EW (VW) columns employ the equal-weighted (value-weighted) dealer centrality measures.
(1) The table reports the average network centrality for each dealer in the intermediation chain. Agency trades in which dealers act as customers' agent instead of principle are eliminated. We restrict the sample to round-trips that involve no more than 6 dealers and no order splitting, the C(N)DC-Nonsplit sample. We measure dealer centrality by the first principle component pca1 of the centrality proxies described in (1) and (2) include all round-trips.
Specifications (3) and (4) restrict the sample to round-trips with at least 2 dealers, so we can determine a head and a tail dealer. Specifications (1) and (3) are estimated using panel regressions with issuer fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the issuer level. Specifications (2) and (4) 
where wij equals the connection strength between dealers i and j, and Xi is a set of explanatory variables. The dependent variables are constructed as average values over the sample period. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood (estimates from GMM/IV are similar and omitted). In Panel A, we impose the restriction that order flow between two dealers exceeds 10,000 transactions over the sample period. In Panel B, we plot the dealer network using all transactions. The plots are generated using multidimensional scaling.
Panel A: Order flow among most active dealers
Figure 2: Market connectedness
The figure documents the connectedness of the market. We plot the inverse distribution function for the degree across dealers in the network. The black dots correspond to the out-degree, the red dots represent in-degrees. For comparison, we add the degree distribution of a random trading network (blue dashed line) and a scale-free trading network (black and red dashed lines).
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Figure 3: Market hierarchy
The figure documents the hierarchical structure of the market. We plot the degree distribution across dealers in the network (horizontal axis) against the clustering coefficient of each dealer (vertical axis). 
